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Constitutional Democracy and the Third
Branch
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain
Professor Eastman, distinguished judges and academics,
and friends:
Thank you for the privilege of speaking before such a
distinguished audience. I am deeply honored and moved by the
Claremont Institute’s Reagan Jurisprudence Award. I am
especially proud to receive it in the name of President Ronald
Reagan because of his commitment to our fundamental
constitutional principles—indeed, to those same founding
principles that the Claremont Institute strives to sustain in
American public life.
I am also personally indebted to him as well because he
appointed me to this Article III judgeship. I think he might well
be pleased to know after having telephoned me that morning in
August, 1986, that I was faithful to his trust in naming me to the
Ninth Circuit, although I was almost rude to him when he called
me at home one day to be assured that he “had my permission” to
sign my nomination and to send it on to the Senate.
As many of you know, President Reagan would never
nominate an Article III judge with whom he had not personally
talked. It was 7:30 in the morning in Portland, Oregon when the
phone rang downstairs, where my wife, Maura, was preparing
breakfast, and I was upstairs just finishing my shower. She
shouted up the stairs that the phone call was for me, to which I
responded, “Who is it?” She said, “I think it’s the press.” To which
I responded, “Tell them I’ll call them back.” Well, the White House
 United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit;
B.A., St. John’s University, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M., University of
Virginia, 1992; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Notre Dame, 2002; LL.D. (Hon.), Lewis & Clark
College, 2003; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Portland, 2011. The views expressed herein are
my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of my colleagues or of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I wish to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance
of E. Garrett West, my law clerk, in preparing these remarks.
 This Address was delivered at Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law
on September 15, 2018, as the Constitution Day Address for the Claremont Institute for
the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy.
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operator overheard my wife’s side of the conversation and said,
“Madam, it’s the Press . . . ident of the United States calling.”
Whereupon Maura shouted, “Dear, it’s President Reagan.”
“I think I’ll take that call,” I said, and thus began a delightful
conversation with one of the most considerate public officials that
I have ever known.
I
Because we are gathered here to celebrate Constitution Day,
and because this particular event draws inspiration from
President Reagan’s jurisprudence, I believe it would be fitting to
begin my remarks by returning to some of his.
Just over thirty years ago, speaking from the East Room of
the White House, President Reagan presided over the
swearing-in ceremony for Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justice Antonin Scalia. He elaborated on the Founders’ vision of
an “independent” judicial branch: “For [the Founders],” he said,
“the question involved in judicial restraint was not—as it is
not—will we have liberal or conservative courts? They knew
that the courts, like the Constitution itself, must not be liberal
or conservative. The question was and is, will we have
government by the people?”1
Today, I would like to reflect on this timeless puzzle: How can
a counter-majoritarian institution like the federal judiciary—an
institution filled with judges whose appointing Presidents long ago
left office, one that enforces laws written by long-dead drafters, and
one that from time to time strikes down statutes written and passed
by the people’s representatives—how can that institution possibly
be in service of “government by the people?” The answer, I will
suggest, is in the textualist and originalist judicial methodologies
which, I believe, are compatible with democratic self-governance
and uniquely promote government by the people.
II
A
Let’s start with the increasingly ascendant approach to
statutory interpretation: Textualism. Judges have looked to the
words of legal instruments to determine their meaning for a

1 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony for William H. Rehnquist
as Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States (Sept. 26, 1986), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1268 (1986).
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long while. Justice Joseph Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the
Constitution, for example, wrote of that document:
[E]very word . . . is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and
common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control,
qualify, or enlarge it. . . . [Constitutions] are . . . fitted for common
understandings. The people make them; the people adopt them; the
people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common
sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite
meaning, or any extraordinary gloss.2

Textualism as a theory of interpretation is of more-recent vintage,
largely developed in response to the perceived excesses of the Warren
Court and popularized by Justice Scalia.3 But, in method, textualism
channels Justice Story. As Justice Scalia explained: Judges should
look to “the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text
of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”4
Though the terminology might be new, the tools are older than Justice
Story and older even than the Constitution.5
How, then, does textualism reinforce democratic processes?
Primarily because textualism respects the “legislative bargain”—the
deal struck among legislators with competing interests and
competing constituencies.6 Passing legislation is a messy and
haphazard business, one that Justice Neil Gorsuch recently
described as “the art of compromises.”7 So, to a judge looking for some
high-minded, purposive reading of the statute, such incongruities
and idiosyncrasies might look instead like inconsistencies. But a
statute’s foibles are not necessarily flaws, and so textualists enforce
the law that the parties managed to pass—not the one that some of
them, in the Court’s view, might have wanted.
I believe the textualists’ respect for this legislative bargain
promotes democratic self-rule. Consider, first, the perspective of the
forward-looking political actor who hopes to pass a new law, or to
fix an old one. Passing such legislation, he or she knows, will require
the investment of considerable political and financial capital. Party
leaders, for instance, might need to make the vote a matter of party
discipline, or to offer a seat on a committee to some recalcitrant dolt.
Likewise, citizens and interest groups can spend money or make
calls to urge the passage of the legislation—all of which expend time
2 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 451 (1833); see also
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Joseph Story, the Natural Law, and Modern Jurisprudence,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2014), https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/HL1239.pdf
(discussing Justice Story’s theory of natural law).
3 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 641–50 (1990).
4 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (1997).
5 See S TORY , supra note 2, § 400 (quoting Blackstone).
6 John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 431 (2005).
7 Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2016).
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and treasure. But textualism promises the legislator a return on
investment: Expend your resources, and the third-branch will
enforce this hard-earned text; your handiwork will govern until
someone else puts as much effort in to change it as you did.
Relatedly, textualism ensures the democratic legitimacy of a
court’s decision, and it reinforces the accountability of the political
branches. When judges enforce the text that Congress wrote, the
case is decided at the politicians’ directive. Sticking to the script is
not only fair to the parties, but it reinforces the basic democratic
principle that elected officials are responsible for the policies and
practices of the government. If you don’t like the law or its
application, then you know whom to blame: Congressmen, unlike
federal judges, can be thrown out of office.
These advantages of textualism perhaps partially explain its
rapid ascendance in the broader legal culture. But we also have to
thank Justice Scalia’s charismatic persistence that Congress means
what it says and says what it means. Just a few years back, Justice
Elena Kagan claimed that he “taught everybody [ ] to do statutory
interpretation differently.”8 Because of him, she claimed, “we’re all
textualists now.”9 And as I’ve argued elsewhere, one of his
most-lasting legacies will likely be that he prodded judges to ask not
what the statute should say, but what it does say.10
Despite textualism’s ascendance among lawyers, politicians
and commentators often seem not to understand the basic
distinction between the lawmaking role of the political branches
and the interpretive role of the courts. Justice Gorsuch, you will
recall, was harangued during his Senate hearings for a dissent he
wrote on the Tenth Circuit.11 Then-Judge Gorsuch would have
sided with a trucking company that fired a driver for abandoning
his broken-down vehicle in subzero temperatures. “It might be fair
to ask whether [the company’s] decision was a wise or kind one,”
he wrote. “But it’s not our job to answer questions like that.
Our only task is to decide whether the decision was an illegal one.”12

8 Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with
Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, Y OUT UBE (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.
9 Id.
10 See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Antonin
Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303 (2017).
11 Michelle Mark, Al Franken slams Gorsuch over ‘absurd’ dissent in frozen-trucker
case: ‘It makes me question your judgment,’ BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.businessinsider.com/senators-grill-gorsuch-over-absurd-dissent-in-frozentrucker-case-2017-3 [http://perma.cc/9PEM-G6XY].
12 Transam Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., No. 15-9504, 2016 WL 3909526, at *7
(10th Cir. July 15, 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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Whether right or wrong on the merits, Justice Gorsuch precisely
described the only legitimate ground for his decision. Critics of
such principled textualism don’t just misunderstand the role of the
federal judge, but they also fail to see the pro-democratic benefits
of the textualist approach.
B
Textualism’s cousin, originalist constitutional interpretation,
gets regularly maligned as somehow deeply anti-democratic—the
traditional name for the objection being the “dead hand”
problem.13 The objection goes something like this: The
Constitution claims to speak for “We the People,” but “We did not
adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone.”14
Originalism, they say, does not secure a “government of laws and
not of men,” but a government of the dead and not of the living.
Originalists have a series of responses. The first, of course, is
that the dead hand argument fails any form of law, or at least
anything short of rule by continuous and unanimous consent. I’ve
been on enough three-judge panels over the last thirty-two years
to know that that won’t work. However, I don’t want to focus on
the reductio ad absurdum response to the dead hand problem.
Instead, I want to make the positive case that this “rule of the
dead” is good for the “rule of the living.”
Indeed, the Constitution’s foundational nature sets in place
the structural and electoral pre-requisites of democratic
governance. In this age when the Court is better known for its
decisions in Roe v. Wade and Obergefell than it is for Myers
v. United States and Noel Canning,15 we often forget that the
Constitution pays careful attention to the unglamorous details of
nation-building—for instance, how many votes does it take to
demand that the Senate or the House record the “Yeas and Nays
of the Members?”16 Likewise, while we simply assume the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment, the Founders
carefully calibrated this system of lawmaking.17

13 Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1127 (1998); Reva Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1399, 1405 (2009).
14 Siegel, supra note 13, at 1399.
15 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (same-sex marriage); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (presidential
removal authority); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (recess appointments).
16 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Note: A one-fifth vote will suffice. Id.
17 See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946–51 (1983).
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With these and many other such rules, the Constitution
determines who gets to act on behalf of the nation, what they may
do, and how they have to go about it. And settling those
preliminary structural questions frees up today’s political actors
to focus on the questions of the day. Judge Michael McConnell
offers a useful analogy: “The rules of basketball do not merely
constrain those who wish to play the game, but also make the
game possible.”18 Speech without grammar is gibberish, and
democracy without structure is mob rule. The Founders wrote the
rules of the game in 1787, and their rulebook makes democratic
politics possible in 2018.
But such response to the dead hand problem does not entirely
dispense with the objection. The judicial branch, of course, has the
authority to “say what the law is,”19 and when the Constitution’s
higher law conflicts with an act of Congress or a state legislature, then
the Supremacy Clause—to say nothing of our oaths of office—dictate
that such law must be set aside. The “rules of the game” response to
the dead hand problem cannot easily explain cases like Brown
v. Board, 20 or West Virginia v. Barnette,21 or even Heller.22 In these
cases, the judge’s role is quite simply to declare the will of elected
officials null and void. How can judicial review be anything but a
constraint on the right of the people to govern themselves?
Well, perhaps the best response is that we embrace the rule of
the dead so as to affirm the possibility of the people’s living
sovereignty. With language echoing the Declaration of Independence,
Chief Justice John Marshall explains as much in Marbury
v. Madison: “The basis on which the whole American fabric has been
erected” is that “the people have an original right to establish, for
their future government, such principles as . . . shall be most
conducive to their happiness.”23 But because the “exercise of this
original right is a very great exertion,” and because it neither
“can [ ] nor ought [ ] be frequently repeated,” the principles “are
deemed fundamental” and are “designed to be permanent.”24 Put
simply, We the People have the right to establish fundamental
political commitments—like the freedom of speech and religion, or
the equality of persons of every race. Enshrining these principles is a
“very great exertion,” and so those commitments cannot be rendered
18 Michael McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1127, 1130 (1997).
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
20 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (school desegregation).
21 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (enjoining enforcement
of regulation requiring students to say the Pledge of Allegiance).
22 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (firearms for self-defense in the home).
23 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
24 Id.
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impermanent by any mere agent of the government—whether that
agent be an unelected judge or an elected legislature.
C
These democratic benefits of faithful adherence to the written
law, whether a congressional statute or the Constitution itself,
should seem especially salient today, when judicial nominations
have become so contested, so bitter, and so focused on the nominees’
political views. For instance, Senator Cory Booker grabbed
headlines when he suggested that supporting Judge Brett
Kavanaugh’s nomination made you “complicit in evil.”25 And of
course, as I’m sure you all recall, there were the sordid anti-Catholic
insinuations against Judge Amy Coney Barrett.
The most significant cause of today’s political angst, I suspect,
is the well-known Supreme Court cases that removed political
questions from the democratic process without even a basis in the
Constitution’s text and structure. Roe v. Wade, the most egregious
case of judicial fiat, compelled Professor John Hart Ely, who was
anything but a right-wing hack, to say: “[Roe] is bad because it is
bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law
and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”26 If the
Supreme Court can do that, who needs Congress?
But mandated social change at the ukase of the Supreme
Court doesn’t only take politics away from the politicians; it also
compromises judicial independence, because it turns courtrooms
into partisan battlegrounds when those political battles should be
happening across the street in the United States Capitol.
Nevertheless, I have hope that the courts will return to their
proper role. With Justice Gorsuch, another principled textualist
and originalist has joined court. And I also hope that one day these
methodologies can be the default commitment of appointees of
both political parties. After all, textualism and originalism are
methodological commitments that can, and should, transcend
political parties.
For instance, Yale Law School Professor Akhil Amar, described
by the New York Times as a “liberal originalist,” argued long before
Heller that the Constitution included a personal right to keep a gun

25 Igor Bobic, Cory Booker Suggests Supporting Brett Kavanaugh Makes One ‘Complicit’ In
Evil, HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cory-bookerbrett-kavanaugh-complicit-evil_us_5b59dce2e4b0fd5c73ccbb0e [http://perma.cc/RBG2-327R].
26 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J.
920, 947 (1973).
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in one’s home for self-defense27—though some originalists, of course,
might read the Second Amendment more broadly than he. He also
testified on Judge Kavanaugh’s behalf and has praised him for his
“studious” attention to “the Constitution’s original meaning.”28 To
take another example, Justice Kagan often writes careful textualist
opinions for the Court that show her methodological seriousness.
My point is not to say that originalism and textualism mean
that judges will always agree on the meaning of the text. But
shared methodologies offer a neutral and a-political basis for
good-faith disagreement.
III
So far, then, I have advanced the argument that textualism
and originalism are not just compatible with democratic self-rule,
but rather that they’re good for it.
To illustrate that point, let me briefly discuss a few of the Court’s
cases from last term. In these decisions, the Supreme Court
reinforced the Constitution’s structural and electoral protections.
Fair warning: These are technical, structural, lawyerly opinions that
may also, for the non-lawyers, be intensely soporific.
A
The first case is Lucia v. SEC.29 There, the Court considered
whether Administrative Law Judges (or, “ALJs” as they’re called) at
the Securities and Exchange Commission were “officers of the United
States” or simply employees. The question mattered because Article
II prescribes only two mechanisms by which a person can be
appointed to an “office”: First, the default rule is that a person must
be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate; second,
Congress “may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.”30 No one argued that the ALJs had been
appointed in accordance with Article II. So by applying past
precedent, the Court concluded that the ALJs were “officers of the
United States” that were subject to the strictures of the
Appointments Clause. Therefore, it vacated the order from the
administrative adjudication.

27 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts, NEW R EPUBLIC (July 11, 1999),
https://newrepublic.com/article/73718/second-thoughts [http://perma.cc/6ZNW-9WU8].
28 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Liberal’s Case for Brett Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-trump.html.
29 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Lucia reinforces the Constitution’s pro-democratic
structural protections. As Justice Thomas’s concurrence
elaborated, the Appointments Clause “maintains clear lines of
accountability—encouraging good appointments and giving the
public someone to blame for the bad ones.”31 In other words, the
Constitution sets in place structural rules that make sure that
elections matter: If the Department of Defense, or Housing and
Urban Development, or the Environmental Protection Agency is
behaving badly, then you know it’s the President’s fault. Here,
the Court issued a seemingly anti-democratic decision; it
declared null a congressionally approved method of hiring ALJs. But
the Court did so in order to further the Constitution’s higher
mandate: Meaningful accountability within the executive branch as
expressed in the text itself.
Similarly, Murphy v. NCAA is a federalism case that ensures that
state elections matter.32 In this case, the Court struck down the
provision in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act that
makes it unlawful for a State to “authorize” sports gambling schemes.
The problem with the statute was not that it concerned some subject
matter beyond the reach of Congress’s enumerated powers (does
anything these days?), but that it specifically “dictate[d] what a state
legislature may and may not do.”33 In the Court’s language, the
regulations “commandeered” the organs of state government.34 Such
commandeering violates the Constitution: While Congress may
regulate individuals, it has no authority to regulate directly the
conduct of states; such a directive would be incompatible with the
Constitution’s system of “dual sovereignty.”35
Like Lucia, the decision in Murphy strikes down a duly enacted
congressional statute, but it does so in the service of the
Constitution’s commitment to democratic self-rule. As the Court
mentions, the “anti-commandeering rule promotes political
accountability” because it maintains clear lines of responsibility.36
When Congress regulates individuals, citizens know that Congress
is to blame for bad laws; when Congress tries to regulate states who
then regulate individuals, the lines of responsibility become blurred.
Citizens must know which politicians to vote out of office. Similarly,
commandeering would have allowed Congress to pass the costs of
regulating onto the states, who then would have to fund Congress’s

Id. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
Id. at 1478.
See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may
not “commandeer” state governments); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (same).
35 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475.
36 Id. at 1477.
31
32
33
34
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mandate. The anti-commandeering rule, however, ensures that
Congress must bear the burden for the programs it enacts. Once
again, the Court’s decision in Murphy ensures meaningful
accountability for Congress.
As an aside, it’s also worth noting that the majorities in
each of these two cases crossed traditional ideological lines.
Justice Kagan’s opinion in Lucia was joined by each of the
Republican-appointed Justices, though Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch concurred in a more-detailed originalist reading of
Article II. Likewise, Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion in Murphy was
joined entirely by Justice Kagan and mostly by Justice Stephen
Breyer. This cross-ideological agreement is a good sign; it tends to
demonstrate the Court’s independence.
IV
Before I close, I would like to return again to President
Reagan’s speech at the swearing-in of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia. There, the President mentioned at least two areas
of ongoing struggle to nurture and to preserve the structure of
government established by the Constitution.
The first struggle is within the judicial branch itself, as Judges
and Justices attempt to stay true to their oaths to “bear true faith
and allegiance” to the Constitution. President Reagan quotes
Justice Felix Frankfurter: “The highest exercise of judicial duty is
to subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private views to the
law.”37 Indeed, Judges and Justices must resist the temptation to
follow personal preferences over the Constitution. This temptation
is especially great in hard cases, when it’s important to have
judges who both care deeply about the Constitution’s text and
structure and have the sharpest legal minds. President Reagan
praised both qualities in Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, and he turned out to be right about both. So far, Justice
Gorsuch also seems to have both qualities. He has not been afraid
to write separately, and he has not been afraid to disagree with his
colleagues on originalist grounds. This independence of mind will
serve the Court well, and we can hope that Judge Kavanaugh, if
and when he’s confirmed, will share similar qualities.38
The second struggle that President Reagan mentioned is one
within the United States at large. President Reagan, at the close

37
38

Reagan, supra note 1.
Note, this Address was given prior to Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation and swearing in.
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of the speech, pointed out that the entire citizenry must work to
preserve the constitutional structure:
We the people are the ultimate defenders of freedom. We the people created
the Government and gave it its powers. And our love of liberty and our
spiritual strength, our dedication to the Constitution, are what, in the end,
preserves our great nation and this great hope for all mankind.39

Nurturing this dedication to the Constitution among citizens is
a worthy and difficult task, but on it hangs the health of this nation’s
great constitutional system. I commend the Claremont Institute, and
all of you in this room, for your dedication to sustaining our Founding
principles, and I am honored to be recognized for my small part in
this noble effort. Thank you all.

39

Reagan, supra note 1.
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